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FINDING A WAY THROUGH THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL MAZE: 





In Airedale National Health Service Trust v. Bland,1 the House of Lords ruled that it 
was lawful to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment from Anthony Bland, the 21 
year old man who, at 17, had fallen into the condition known as permanent2 
vegetative state (PVS) following the Hillsborough disaster. Their Lordships agreed 
that although, in withdrawing the life-sustaining treatment, the death of Anthony 
Bland would be intended,3 his death would not be regarded at law as caused by the 
withdrawal of the treatment, but rather by his underlying condition.4 In reaching this 
conclusion, their Lordships relied on the controversial distinction between acts and 
omissions: a doctor does not, merely by omitting to treat a patient, thereby cause their 
death, but rather simply allows the patient to die naturally from their underlying 
condition. In the absence of any duty on the doctor to continue the treatment, a doctor 
could not, therefore, be held criminally liable for the patient’s death. It followed, they 
held, that the doctors who withdrew the treatment from Anthony Bland could not be 
regarded at law as having murdered him. Indeed, they could be guilty neither of 
murder nor of manslaughter.  
 
                                                 
 BA (Hons) (Lancaster), MA (Dist) (Lancaster), PhD (Essex). Thanks to Associate Professor Lindy 
Willmott and Dr Ben White at QUT for helpful comments on earlier drafts.  
1 [1993] A.C. 789. 
2 I use the term ‘permanent’ rather than ‘persistent’ here in order to emphasise the fact that the law is 
intended to deal only with those cases in which the condition is irreversible. For discussion of the 
importance of this distinction, see the remarks by J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, ‘The Management of 
the Persistent Vegetative State in the British Isles’ (1996) 4 Jur.Rev. 263, at 263-4.  
3 [1993] A.C. 789 at 876-7, 881, 887, 896.  
4 Lord Mustill rejected the view that Anthony Bland’s death could be regarded in law as exclusively 
caused by his underlying condition: [1993] A.C. 789 at 895.  
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In reaching their decision, a number of the judges entertained doubts concerning the 
moral relevance of the distinction between an act, on the one hand, and an omission, 
on the other. In doubting the moral relevance of this distinction, the judges were 
aware that, ultimately, they were doubting the moral relevance of the distinction 
between withholding and withdrawing medical treatment (or the basic necessities of 
life)5 and euthanasia. Lord Mustill, for instance, noted: 
 
The conclusion that the declarations can be upheld depends crucially on a 
distinction drawn by the criminal law between acts and omissions, and carries 
with it inescapably a distinction between, on the one hand what is often called 
‘mercy killing’, where active steps are taken in a medical context to terminate 
the life of a suffering patient, and a situation such as the present, where the 
proposed conduct has the aim for equally humane reasons of terminating the 
life of Anthony Bland by withholding from him the basic necessities of life. 
The acute unease which I feel about adopting this way through the legal and 
ethical maze is I believe due in an important part to the sensation that however 
much the terminologies may differ the ethical status of the two courses of 
action is for all relevant purposes indistinguishable. 6 
 
Lord Mustill concluded that by upholding the declarations sought (that it would be 
lawful to withdraw treatment from Anthony Bland) on the basis of the act/omission 
distinction, the House would inevitably ‘only emphasise the distortions of a legal 
                                                 
5 Some doubt has been expressed concerning whether artificial nutrition can properly be regarded as 
medical treatment, and the issue was wrestled with in Bland. The judges decided that it was, in fact, to 
be regarded as medical treatment, but this view has been criticised in the academic literature. See, e.g., 
J. M. Finnis, ‘Bland: Crossing the Rubicon?’ (1993) 109 L.Q.R. 329 at 335. 
6 [1993] A.C. 789 at 887.  
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structure which is already both morally and intellectual misshapen’.7 Lord Browne-
Wilkinson confessed to finding the same difficulty. Conceding that the distinction he 
relied on to reach his conclusion ‘will appear to some irrational’, his Lordship could 
only respond by insisting that the distinction is nevertheless recognised at law: 
 
How can it be lawful to allow a patient to die slowly, though painlessly, over a 
period of weeks from lack of food, but unlawful to produce his immediate 
death by a lethal injection, thereby saving his family from yet another ordeal 
to add to the tragedy that has already struck them? I find it difficult to find a 
moral answer to that question. But it is undoubtedly the law and nothing I 
have said casts doubt on the proposition that the doing of a positive act with 
the intention of ending life is and remains murder.8  
 
The decision and, in particular, these frank concessions, on the part of their Lordships, 
to finding intractable difficulties with the (moral) distinction between withholding and 
withdrawing treatment and euthanasia, has led to considerable academic criticism and 
debate which is still continuing today.  
 
Much of the literature has been concerned with the implications of the decision for the 
principle of the sanctity of life and the potential for the full legalisation of euthanasia. 
A number of the judges, both in the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, accepted 
that their decision – and the basis upon which it was reached – had significant 
ramifications for the principle of the sanctity of life: although important, the principle 
                                                 
7 [1993] A.C. 789 at 887.  
8 [1993] A.C. 789 at 885.  
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was not absolute.9 These remarks, together with those of Lord Mustill and Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson concerning the difficulty of finding a morally relevant criterion for 
distinguishing between withdrawal of medical treatment and euthanasia, have led 
some commentators to the view that the distinction between lawful withdrawal and 
euthanasia is wholly a matter of policy. This, in turn, has led commentators to call for 
a new ‘quality of life’ ethic to replace ‘the old Sanctity of Life ethic’ – a move which 
would pave the way for the legalisation of euthanasia. Peter Singer, for instance, lauds 
the decision for finally conceding that intentional killing is legal in some 
circumstances. He sees this concession as an explicit rejection of the sanctity of life 
principle, arguing that, in the contemporary age, considerations as to the quality of life 
are an inherent feature of medical practice.10 Others have resisted such a call as an 
overreaction,11 and have sought to re-examine the decision in Bland to see if a better 
analysis of the decision reached in the case is available – one that concedes less 
ground to proponents of the legalisation of euthanasia. John Finnis and John Keown, 
for example, have both, in separate articles,12 attempted to show that an alternative 
legal analysis of the facts of Bland to that offered in the Bland case itself is available 
which would restore moral and intellectual shape to the law and provide a clear, 
morally relevant criterion for distinguishing between permissible withdrawal of 
medical treatment and euthanasia. These articles have been discussed in later 
decisions, most notably the recent conjoined twins case, Re A (Children)(Conjoined 
Twins),13 and have arguably helped shape the subsequent law in this area – leading 
                                                 
9 [1993] A.C. 789, per Lord Goff at 864;  per Butler-Sloss L.J. at 819-823; per Hoffman L.J. at 826-8; 
per Lord Keith at 859.  
10 P. Singer, Rethinking Life and Death (Oxford 1994) at 75. 
11 See J. Keown, ‘Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland’ (1997) 113 L.Q.R. 
481 at 481, though Keown concedes the decision dealt a blow to the principle which ‘may yet prove to 
be fatal’ at 481. 
12 See J. M. Finnis, supra n. 5; J. Keown, supra n. 11.  
13 [2001] Fam. 147. 
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some judges to modify their account of the rational basis on which they consider 
withdrawal and withholding treatment to be justified.14 The articles have also been 
influential in proposals for parliamentary intervention in England to explicitly outlaw 
omissions with the intention to bring about the death of terminally-ill or severely brain 
damaged patients.15  
 
In summary,16 these authors argue that withdrawal of treatment with the intention of 
bringing about the patient’s death should unquestionably be seen to be a species of 
euthanasia, and that, therefore, their Lordships were right to find themselves at a loss 
when attempting to find a morally relevant criterion with which to distinguish that 
which they were sanctioning in Bland from euthanasia. But their Lordships went 
wrong, they argue, in characterising the proposed conduct in Bland as intending the 
patient’s death. A better, more consistent, approach would have been to recognise that 
the death of Anthony Bland was foreseen, not intended, and that, consequently, the 
decision to withdraw treatment was justified because its purpose (or intention) was 
not to allow Anthony Bland to die, but simply to cease subjecting him to continual 
invasive medical intervention when that intervention had become futile.17 Anthony 
Bland’s death was therefore, strictly speaking, a foreseen side effect of this primary 
intention to release him from such invasive but futile medical treatment.  
 
In this paper, I will be examining the arguments put forward by these authors in some 
detail. My argument will be that, while an attempt to find an alternative rationale for 
the legality of withdrawal of medical treatment is welcome, the influential analysis of 
                                                 
14 [2001] Fam. 147. I examine the analysis of some of the authors whose views played a role in the 
reasoning in these subsequent cases below.  
15 ‘Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) Bill’, H.C. (99) 00/8. 
16 The arguments will be analysed in considerable detail in section IIB below. 
17 See J. Keown, supra n. 11. 
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Keown and Finnis fails. The central difficulty with their approach, I argue, lies not in 
their attempt to distinguish between intention and foresight – a distinction which they 
are right to insist upon as a cogent and therefore defensible distinction – but rather in 
their attempt to apply that distinction to all cases of withdrawing medical treatment 
which the law currently sanctions. I argue that an attempt to apply this distinction 
outside the context of palliative care leads to the trap, of which Lord Mustill warned, 
of being forced to draw ‘excessively fine distinctions’18 in order to defend a particular 
legal and ethical outcome. It consequently becomes a species of ethics and law by 
categorisation.  
 
I then examine an alternative basis located in Bland itself for the permissibility and 
lawfulness of withholding and withdrawal of treatment and argue that such a basis 
does, contra the reasoning in Bland, provide a morally relevant criterion for 
distinguishing between acts and omissions in the context of such patients, and that 
Lord Mustill’s and Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s anxieties concerning euthanasia are 
unjustified.  
 
In the following section, I analyse the Bland decision and the criticisms made of 
Bland in more detail, examining, in particular, the alternative basis for the lawfulness 
of the withdrawal that has been suggested in the academic literature. 
 
II. LIMITS OF THE APPLICABILITY OF THE INTENTION/FORESIGHT 
DISTINCTION 
 
                                                 
18 [1993] A.C. 789 at 898.  
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A. Bland and the Intention to Bring about the Patient’s Death 
 
In one important respect, the majority decision in Bland seems to sit uncomfortably 
with some of the cases that were approvingly referred to in the judgement. For 
instance, in Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment),19 a case that concerned the 
withholding of further medical treatment from a severely brain damaged baby, Lord 
Donaldson notes that: 
 
What courts have to decide is whether, in the best interests of the child patient, 
a particular decision as to medical treatment should be taken which as a side 
effect will render death more or less likely.20 
 
He then adds: 
 
What can never be justified is the use of drugs or surgical procedures with the 
primary purpose of [hastening the patient’s death]21 
 
Lord Donaldson seems here to countenance the possibility that death should be 
regarded as a side-effect of, rather than as aimed at by, the particular decision as to 
medical treatment taken. In other words, the death of the patient is not to be regarded 
as intended when treatment is withdrawn.  
 
Lord Taylor, too, expresses a similar view: 
 
                                                 
19 [1991] Fam. 33.  
20 [1991] Fam. 33 at 46, italics in original.  
21 [1991] Fam. 33 at 46. 
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It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the court never sanctions steps to 
terminate life. That would be unlawful. There is no question of approving, 
even in a case of the most horrendous disability, a course aimed at terminating 
life or accelerating death. The court is only concerned with the circumstances 
in which steps should not be taken to prolong life.22 
 
Importantly, these views are reflected in the BMA’s guidance for decision making for 
withholding and withdrawing life-prolonging treatment: 
 
Although the health care team may foresee that withholding or withdrawing 
life-prolonging treatment will result in the patient’s death, this is 
fundamentally different from action taken with the purpose or objective of 
ending the patient’s life.23 
 
Yet in Bland, three of the five judges stated that withdrawal in that case was 
motivated by an intention to bring about the death of Anthony Bland. Lord Browne-
Wilkinson, for instance, claimed: 
 
What is proposed in the present case is to adopt a course with the intention of 
bringing about Anthony Bland’s death. As to the element of intention, or mens 
rea, in my judgement there can be no real doubt that it is present in this case: 
                                                 
22 [1991] Fam. 33 at 53, italics added. 
23 BMA, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-prolonging Medical Treatment. Guidance for Decision-
Making (BMJ Books 1999) at 50. The GMC guidelines, by contrast, reflect the position articulated in 
Bland. In an Appendix to the guidelines summarising the law, the following is asserted: 
 An act where the doctor's primary intention is to bring about a patient's death would be 
unlawful. 
 Withholding or withdrawing treatment is regarded in law as an 'omission' not an 'act'. 
The implication of this way of stating the law is that an omission where the doctor’s primary intention 
is to bring about the patient’s death would be lawful. This accurately reflects the view taken in Bland.  
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the whole purpose of stopping artificial feeding is to bring about the death of 
Anthony Bland.24 
 
Similarly, Lord Mustill said: 
 
[T]he proposed conduct has the aim… of terminating the life Anthony Bland 
by withholding from him the basic necessities of life25…the conduct…is 
intended to be…the cause of death.26 
 
Finally, Lord Lowry remarked: 
 
[T]he intention to bring about the patient’s death is there.27 
 
How, then, could the proposed withdrawal be considered lawful? The House 
unanimously accepted that, although an intention to bring about Anthony Bland’s 
death was present, the doctors would escape criminal liability on the ground that the 
withdrawal of medical treatment would be an omission, not an act, and, since there 
was no duty to provide medical treatment when that treatment was not in Anthony 
Bland’s best interests, the omission would not in law amount to the cause of 
Anthony’s death.  
 
It is this aspect of the decision that created some of the anxieties expressed by Lord 
Mustill and Lord Browne-Wilkinson which I have noted in the introduction, and 
                                                 
24 [1993] A.C. 789 at 881. 
25 [1993] A.C. 789 at 887. 
26 [1993] A.C. 789 at 896. 
27 [1993] A.C. 789 at 876-7. 
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which has led to considerable criticism: as soon as it is admitted that the intention to 
bring about Anthony Bland’s death is present, it seems illogical that doctors should be 
able to escape liability if their intention is carried out by means of an omission, but 
should not be able to escape liability if their intention is carried out by means of an 
act. For the same reason, it seems as though the moral and legal basis for the 
lawfulness of the conduct, which had been clearly articulated in such cases as Re J by 
Lord Donaldson and Lord Taylor, has become unclear. As Finnis remarks: 
 
What is misshapen and indefensible is a law that treats as criminal a harmful 
‘act’ while treating as lawful (and indeed compulsory) an ‘omission’ with the 
very same intent, by one who has a duty to care for the person injured.28 
 
In section III, I will argue that Lord Mustill and Lord Browne-Wilkinson have 
mistaken the significance of the act and omission distinction in this context, and that 
their anxieties, together with those expressed by academic criticism, are unfounded. 
To the extent that this is the case, I will be arguing that the law as developed in Bland 
(and not the account of the law given by Lords Mustill and Browne-Wilkinson in that 
case) is not intellectually and morally misshapen. First, however, it is necessary to 
turn to some of the alternative bases on which the decision could, according to 
academic criticism, have been made.  
 
B. Intention in Withholding and Withdrawing Treatment 
 
                                                 
28 J. M. Finnis, supra n. 5 at 333. 
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John Finnis and John Keown have both argued that the way to restore moral and 
intellectual shape to the law after Bland is simply to reject the majority view that, in 
withdrawing medical treatment from Anthony Bland, the doctors intended to bring 
about Anthony’s death.29 In making this point, they rely on the distinction between 
intention, on the one hand, and foresight, on the other. We can distinguish, they claim, 
between a doctor who withdraws treatment intending thereby to kill their patient, and 
a doctor who does so merely foreseeing that his or her patient will die. In the former 
case, the medical practitioner is committing murder because the whole purpose of 
their conduct is to bring about the death of the patient – the death of the patient is the 
aim of the withdrawal. In the latter case, by contrast, the aim is to relieve the patient 
of burdensome treatment, or, where the patient has, as in Bland, permanently lost their 
capacity for consciousness, to cease subjecting the patient to invasive and futile 
treatment. Here, in contrast to the former case, the death of the patient is not intended 
because it is not the purpose of the withdrawal of treatment, but merely its side-
effect.30   
 
This distinction between intended and foreseen results has proven to be extremely 
controversial and its legal status is now even more in doubt following the decision in 
R v. Woollin.31 The literature on the distinction, both in law and in philosophy, is 
considerable. It is not possible to review, or analyse, all the arguments that have been 
advanced to attack the distinction. The main line of criticism is clear enough: if a 
person performs an act in the full knowledge that, as a consequence of that act, a result 
is certain, that person has surely intended that result, and so the distinction between 
                                                 
29 See J. M. Finnis, supra n. 5 at 332; J. Keown, supra n. 11.  
30 It is, of course, possible to intend side-effects, so the contrast between an intended effect and a mere 
side-effect is not always applicable. Nevertheless, this point need not affect this argument, which is 
only dependent on the possibility that the distinction sometimes applies.  
31 [1999] 1 A.C. 82. 
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an intended result and a merely foreseen one cannot be drawn in such a case. Indeed, 
a number of writers and judges take the view that the result need not even be 
absolutely certain: it is sufficient for the result to be merely virtually certain. In R v. 
Woollin, for example, Lord Steyn declared that 
 
a result foreseen as virtually certain is an intended result.32  
 
In the following section I shall briefly examine whether the distinction between 
intention and foresight can indeed be defended. Having shown that it can, I next turn 
to diagnosing why the two concepts are often conflated. Finally, I examine whether 
the application of this distinction, by Keown and Finnis, to the case of lawful 
withdrawal can be sustained.  
 
1. Intention and Foresight: a Cogent Distinction? 
 
There can be no doubt that the distinction between an intended consequence of an act, 
and a consequence of an act foreseen as certain, is a valid distinction. An intended 
consequence, unlike a foreseen one, is a consequence that is deliberately aimed at or 
                                                 
32 [1999] 1 A.C. 82 at 93. The legal implications of this statement are uncertain. There are currently 
two competing interpretations of Woollin. One is that intention and foresight of consequences as 
virtually certain are identical. Another, however, consistent with the law on this point up to Woollin (R 
v. Maloney [1985] A.C. 905; R v. Hancock [1986] A.C. 455.) is that a jury may, i.e., is entitled to, infer 
intention from foresight of a consequence as virtually certain, but that it is not compelled to do so. This 
view accepts that while intention and foresight might coincide in some circumstances, the two concepts 
are nevertheless separate. For discussion see C.M.V. Clarkson and H.M. Keating, Criminal Law: Text 
and Materials, fifth ed., (Sweet & Maxwell 2003) at 121-143. In Re A (Children)(Conjoined Twins) 
[2001] Fam. 147, Robert Walker LJ noted that even if that statement were binding on the court, the 
doctrine of double effect would nevertheless still apply because the bad effect is merely a side effect of 
the good one. It is difficult, however, to see on what basis this claim can overcome the objection raised 
by Lord Steyn if that objection is cogent: regardless of the fact that it is brought about by a good effect, 
if the bad effect is foreseen as virtually certain, it would be intended. Lord Steyn’s statement is 
effectively a rejection of the doctrine of double effect in so far as it denies the possibility of drawing 
the distinction upon which the doctrine is reliant for its sense.  
 13
is the purpose33 of the action. The police officer who breaks bad news to the relatives 
of a missing loved one is certain the relatives will be upset, but he or she does not, by 
knowing this when he or she breaks that news to the relatives, intend to upset them, 
because upsetting them is not the purpose for which the news is broken. A barrister 
who has to remain awake for most of the night to prepare their brief by the tight 
deadline the following morning, knows for certain that they will become tired through 
lack of sleep, but they do not thereby intend to become tired because, again, becoming 
tired is not the purpose for which they stay awake. A doctor who puts his patient on a 
course of chemotherapy knows that, as a consequence of the therapy, the patient will 
suffer certain very unpleasant side-effects, but the doctor does not intend the patient to 
suffer those side-effects. More to the point, the patient herself does not intend to 
suffer those side-effects. Once again, the purpose of the treatment is to make the 
cancer recede, and, thereby, to make the patient better. 
 
In all the above examples, the side-effect is not the purpose of the conduct in 
question. Is it the means to that purpose? If the conduct is the means to achieving that 
purpose, then the means by which that purpose is achieved is also generally regarded 
as intended.34 But in all the cases above, the side-effect can be regarded neither as the 
purpose nor the means by which that purpose is to be effectuated. The policeman does 
not achieve the purpose of informing the relatives of the loss of their loved one by 
                                                 
33 As Alan White points out (A. White, Grounds of liability: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 
(Oxford 1985) Ch 5), intention is not synonymous with purpose but is slightly broader than it: I can act 
with the intention of doing something without having the purpose of doing it, as when I go to a meeting 
with the intention of leaving early – my purpose in going to the meeting is not to leave early but rather, 
e.g., to make my views known, but my intention is both to make my views known and to leave early. 
This qualification is not important here. 
34 This is because the means of achieving the purpose is done expressly in order to achieve that 
purpose, and so is itself purposed. For example, if I intend to complain to the manager regarding 
service at the local restaurant, I can do so by telephone or in writing. My telephoning or writing is the 
means by which I carry out my purpose of complaining; I telephone or write in order to complain, or 
for the purpose of complaining.  
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upsetting them. Likewise, the barrister does not achieve his purpose of finishing the 
brief properly by getting tired (but rather by staying up and continuing to work 
throughout the night). Finally, the doctor does not achieve the purpose of making the 
cancer recede by making the patient suffer the side-effects of the treatment – the side-
effect of vomiting, for example, is not the means by which the cancer is made to 
recede.  
 
It follows from these examples that a result foreseen as certain does not always suffice 
for intention: while the two can coincide, they do not always do so, and they are not, 
therefore, identical. To the extent that their lordships in R v. Woollin35 may have 
thought otherwise, it must respectfully be concluded that they were in error.36  
 
Why then, has there been so much confusion concerning the relationship between 
intention and foresight? Part of the difficulty in accepting the distinction stems, I 
                                                 
35 [1999] 1 A.C. 82. 
36 The error has significant ramifications in English law. For instance, one of the rationales for Lord 
Joffe’s Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2005 [HL] is that doctors remain uncertain whether 
they may face prosecution for murder when administering pain relief if such relief can only be brought 
about at the cost of abbreviating the patient’s life. Clause 15 of the Bill provides that ‘a patient 
suffering from a terminal illness shall be entitled to request and receive such medication as may be 
necessary to keep him free as far as possible from pain and distress’. Commenting on this clause, Lord 
Joffe notes: ‘... it is clear that there are a number of doctors who are concerned about using the double-
effect principle in order to ease the pain or their patients because they are frightened they may be 
prosecuted’, Report of the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Committee, House of Lords, [35], 2005. 
It is, however, unnecessary to enact the Bill proposed by Lord Joffe in order to overcome this concern. 
As shown above, the distinction between an intended consequence of one’s act and a foreseen 
consequence of one’s act is cogent, and the two should not be conflated. Provided the intention is to 
alleviate pain, rather than kill the patient, a doctor need not fear prosecution: even though they foresee 
the abbreviation of the patient’s life as a certain consequence, this, of itself, does not suffice for 
intention, as the police officer example shows.  In Queensland, the State Government amended the 
Criminal Code (Qld) in order to remove any residual uncertainty regarding double-effect. Section 282A 
of the Criminal Code (Qld) now provides that a person is not criminally responsible for providing 
palliative care to another person, even if an incidental effect of providing the care is to hasten the other 
person’s death, provided the care is given in good faith and with reasonable care and skill, that is, in 
accordance with good medical practice, having regard to the person’s state at the time and all the 
circumstances of the case. There is no reason why a similar legislative provision could not be enacted 
in England to clarify the position, particularly in the wake of the questionable dicta in R v. Woolin 
[1999] 1 A.C. 82. It would be unnecessary to go further, as Lord Joffe’s Bill proposes to do, and 
legalise assisted dying.  
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would argue, from two distinct, noteworthy features of the relationship between the 
two concepts: 
1. There are clear cut cases, and borderline cases. The line dividing the two can 
be, in some cases, blurry. Those who are sceptical of the distinction tend to 
fasten exclusively on the borderline cases – often cases thought up precisely in 
order to argue that the distinction is not valid.37 In doing so, they mistakenly 
infer, from the existence of borderline cases, the non-existence of clear cut 
cases, and therewith the invalidity of the distinction. An example of a 
borderline case comes from Professor Glanville Williams.  Consider a bomber 
who blows up a passenger aircraft in order to recover on the insurance. Is the 
death of the passengers in this case a side-effect of his purpose of recovering 
on the insurance, or is it his purpose, or, alternatively, is it a means (and so 
intended) of doing so? Classically, instead of rejecting the example as a 
borderline case (which would, if it ever came to court, have to be decided on 
its facts), the literature has been replete with examples of tests designed to 
overcome these borderline case examples, in order to maintain the strictness or 
simplicity of the line dividing intention from foresight. The assumption of 
such a procedure is that if an answer to such examples cannot be found, the 
distinction must be unworkable. Thus Antony Duff has proposed the test that, 
if the objective were achieved without the consequence foreseen actually 
ensuing, and if the accused would not regard their actions as a failure when the 
consequence did not ensue, then they did not intend that consequence.38 Thus, 
if the passengers in the plane could all have parachuted to safety following the 
                                                 
37 See A. McGee ‘Double Effect in the Criminal Code (Qld)’ (2004) 4(1) Queensland University of 
Technology Law and Justice Journal 46 at 54. 
38 A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability: Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law 
(Blackwell 1990) at 61-3. 
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explosion of the bomb, the bomber, having got his insurance money, would 
not be disappointed that the passengers did not die. On this test, the bomber 
could not have intended the passengers’ death.   
 
The problem with this test is two-fold. First, it can encourage bad science 
fiction which only leads to further confusion. In our world, if a plane is blown 
up with passengers aboard, it simply isn’t possible that all the passengers may 
nevertheless parachute to safety. Our categories of what is intended and what 
is foreseen, of what is a means and what is a mere side-effect, apply in a world 
where bombing passenger jets necessarily results in passenger deaths. Our 
inability to know, in the abstract, how we should categorise the bomber’s state 
of mind in Williams’ example cannot be solved by examining how we would 
categorise events in imagined and fanciful factual scenarios that bear no 
relation to our actual world.  Because, in our world, bombing passenger planes 
necessarily results in passenger deaths, it is not meaningful to consider 
whether the bomber would think himself to have failed in his mission if, by 
some miracle, all the passengers survived – there simply is no room for such a 
question.  
 
Second, the analysis offered by Duff can quickly lead to counter-intuitive 
results. For example, if the terrorist suicide bombers could somehow 
miraculously have survived when the planes hit the twin towers on September 
the 11th, and if they could have escaped the authorities so as to be able to 
launch other terrorist missions, no doubt they, too, would not regard their 
actions as a failure if they did not in fact succeed in killing themselves on 
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flying into the towers. On such an analysis, the suicide bombers would not 
have intended their own deaths (but would merely have foreseen them), and so 
would not have committed suicide – which, of course, is absurd. Such a 
counter-intuitive example illustrates the danger of drawing intolerably fine 
distinctions in order to try to accommodate borderline cases under a strict rule, 
and is an example of the kinds of absurdities that can result – a kind of ethics 
by categorisation.39  
2. The second noteworthy feature is that, in cases where intention is present, the 
consequence is often foreseen as certain.40 Foresight of result and intention to 
produce that result often coincide and, because of this, we may be tempted to 
assume that they therefore must always coincide. This, I would argue, is a 
significant reason why some critics have been tempted to reject the distinction. 
For example, if I foresee that, by giving directions to somebody on how to get 
to the Tate Modern, I will certainly send them the wrong way (I don’t have 
any idea of how to get there), yet I give those directions in that knowledge, I 
must intend them to lose their way, for otherwise I would simply refrain from 
                                                 
39 Another problem with Duff’s test is that it confuses intention with desire. The bomber may not 
desire the passenger deaths, but he may nevertheless intend them. The fact that he would not be 
disappointed should he achieve his end without causing the deaths of the passengers only shows that he 
does not desire to kill them, even though he intends to do so.  
40 Note here that we are dealing with a case where the consequence is foreseen as certain. It is, of 
course, generally true that foresight of a consequence as a possibility (not a certainty) is a necessary 
condition for intention, even though it is not a sufficient condition for it – I cannot meaningfully intend 
to do something that it is impossible for me to do, such as go to Jupiter. My claim here is that even a 
consequence foreseen as certain is not a sufficient condition of intention (and, obviously, it is not a 
necessary condition either because only foresight of possible consequences is necessary). 
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giving the directions.41 In this case, there is no room for foreseeing the result 
without also intending it, because there is an obvious alternative available.42  
 
2. How does the distinction apply in the medical context? 
 
2.1 Palliative care 
 
We have seen that, since foresight of a result as certain is not sufficient for intending 
that result when the agent acts with that foresight, the distinction between intention 
and foresight is cogent. We have also diagnosed some of the reasons why certain 
philosophers of law and certain judges have been misled into denying the difference. 
How, then, is the distinction used in the medical context? One area in which there is a 
significant amount of agreement – in the law at least43 – concerns the applicability of 
the distinction to the case of palliative care. At common law44 (and in some statutes)45 
the principle of double effect applies to the case of palliative care. This principle 
states that it is permissible to aim to bring about a good effect, even if the agent 
knows (foresees) that, as a side-effect of that realised intention, a bad effect will 
follow, provided that the bad effect is not itself intended and that the good effect is 
not brought about by means of the bad effect. The principle is therefore dependent on 
                                                 
41 It might be thought that I might only intend to avoid embarrassment about not knowing the way 
rather than actually intending the tourist to lose their way. But it should be noted that, if the means by 
which I avoid embarrassment is by sending them the wrong way, then sending them the wrong way 
remains, of course, intended. Further, it is more accurate, I think, to say that my sending them the 
wrong way is motivated by my desire to avoid embarrassment: in other words, care must be taken not 
to confuse intention, on the one hand, with desire and motive, on the other. 
42 This is an adaptation of an example used by Keown to illustrate another point. 
43 On the whole, philosophers have been more sceptical of the distinction, although, as yet, they have 
not provided an attempt to rebut the considerations offered above. Further, the legal position of double 
effect has been thrown into doubt following the incorrect statements in Woollin that a result foreseen as 
virtually certain is an intended result. Some doctors consequently remain uncertain, in England, 
whether they can rely on the doctrine of double effect to protect them from prosecution if, in 
administering palliative care, they should incidentally hasten a patient’s death. See supra n. 36. 
44 R v. Adams [1957] Crim L.R. 365; Airedale National Health Service Trust v. Bland [1993] A.C. 789.  
45 See s 282A Criminal Code (Qld); Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA). 
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the intention/foresight distinction: a doctor can alleviate a patient’s pain (the good 
effect) even though s/he foresees that the patient’s death will be hastened (the bad 
effect), provided that s/he does not intend the bad effect (that is, does not deliberately 
aim or plan to bring that bad effect about) and provided that the death of the patient is 
not the means by which pain relief is brought about.  
 
In the case of palliative care, it is easy to see how the distinction between an intended 
result of the agent’s act and a foreseen result of that act can be drawn in a relatively 
clear way. First, the drugs used in palliative care have pain relieving properties, which 
properties are independent of the drugs’ capacity, in large doses, to abbreviate the 
patient’s life.46 This distinguishes them from, e.g., carbon monoxide gas which might 
be used in practices of euthanasia – such drugs can be used for no other purpose than 
that of bringing about the patient’s death. Second, because of this property, the 
patient’s death is not the means by which pain relief is brought. In all cases, an 
amount of time will pass between the relief and the unintended consequence. Since 
the relief takes place before the consequence, that consequence cannot be the means 
by which the relief is achieved, but is, at most, a side-effect of it. Alternatively put: 
the pain relief is not a consequence of the patient’s death, but rather the reverse: the 
patient’s death is a consequence of the pain relief. 
 
2.2. Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment 
 
Can the doctrine of double effect, and the distinction between intention and foresight, 
apply to cases of withdrawing and withholding treatment? Keown and Finnis argue 
                                                 
46 See A. McGee supra n. 35 at 53. 
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that it can, and that their Lordships were either wrong in Bland to rule that withdrawal 
of medical treatment from Anthony Bland (or the necessities of life) was governed by 
an intention to bring about Anthony’s death, or were right to do so and should 
therefore have declared that withdrawal of artificial means of nutrition would be 
unlawful.47 John Keown has developed a considerably detailed argument to the effect 
that withdrawal of treatment need not be construed as intending the patient’s death, 
and so I shall concentrate in what follows on Keown’s account.  
 
Keown’s argument can be shortly stated. He argues that a doctor need not be 
understood as intending to bring about the death of the patient in cases where it is 
permissible to withhold or withdraw treatment because the death need not be 
understood as aimed at, or purposed. Instead, the aim of withdrawing the treatment is 
to relieve the patient from burdensome treatment which is serving no worthwhile 
purpose: 
 
….a doctor may properly withhold or withdraw a life-prolonging treatment 
which is futile (that is, cannot secure a significant therapeutic benefit) or 
which the patient would find too burdensome, even though the doctor foresees 
that non-treatment may or will result in the patient’s life ending sooner than 
would otherwise be the case.48 
 
                                                 
47 The first alternative is that adopted by Keown. The latter, may have been adopted by Finnis. I say 
‘may’ because his review essay is ambiguous on this issue. He agrees that patients should not be given 
“all the medical treatments that would be provided to a patient in better shape and with better 
prospects” but because of his claim that artificial nutrition should not be regarded as medical treatment, 
his position on exactly what should have been decided in Bland is not clear. 
48 J. Keown, supra n. 11 at 484. 
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The effect of actualising this aim is a good effect, and the bad effect, viz, the death of 
the patient, is merely a side-effect of this good effect. Further, the death of the patient 
is not a means to the good effect because the means by which relief of burdensome 
treatment is achieved is simply the withdrawal of the treatment itself. The death of the 
patient is therefore an unintended side-effect of the withdrawal. 
 
It is essential to note that the corner-stone of Keown’s argument is the notion of 
medical futility. The treatment which is to be withheld or withdrawn must not be 
serving any worthwhile purpose – if it were serving a worthwhile purpose, then the 
fact that it was burdensome would not be an adequate reason for withdrawing it, and 
the distinction between an intended and merely foreseen consequence would 
evaporate in such a case. This is because, on the assumption the treatment is 
worthwhile, the patient can ultimately be restored to a better position from which, 
presumably, they would no longer require the treatment. To sanction withdrawal in 
such a case would therefore be to commit oneself to the belief that burdensome 
treatment, which serves a useful purpose, can nevertheless constitute a reason for 
terminating someone’s life. This would inevitably be a judgement concerning the 
value of someone’s life, not the value of the treatment. For Keown, judgements 
concerning the quality of someone’s life can never be a relevant factor in the 
withdrawal of someone’s treatment.  
 
It follows that, for Keown, whether or not the treatment is serving a worthwhile 
purpose must itself be determined without making any reference to the quality of the 
patient’s life. Rather, whether a treatment is ‘worthwhile’ must be understood as an 
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exclusively medical question: ‘worthwhile’ is to be taken to mean ‘medically 
worthwhile’:  
 
A treatment may be not worthwhile either because it offers no reasonable hope 
of benefit or because, even though it does, the expected benefit would be 
outweighed by burdens which the treatment would impose, such as excessive 
pain. Notice, however, that the question is always whether the treatment 
would be worthwhile, not whether the patient’s life would be worthwhile. 
Were one to engage in judgements of the latter sort, and to conclude that 
certain lives were not worth living, one would forfeit any principled basis for 
objecting to intentional killing.49 
 
In sum, then, Keown recognises that if the doctrine of the sanctity of life is to remain 
intact (and not be eroded, as the Lords thought in Bland, by the permissibility of 
intentional killing), then the following conditions must be met: 
1. the death of the patient must be merely foreseen, not intended; and 
2. for the death merely to be foreseen, rather than intended, it is necessary that 
there be some achievable purpose independent of the death of the patient 
which the doctor can be said to aim at or intend in withdrawing the treatment – 
for example, the purpose of relieving the patient of burdensome treatment; and 
3. the burdensome treatment which the doctor is considering withdrawing must 
be futile, that is, serve no useful therapeutic purpose; and 
4. the futility of that treatment must be determined exclusively in medical terms 
– the question merely takes the patient’s condition into account in deciding on 
                                                 
49 Ibid. at 485. 
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the worthwhileness of a proposed treatment, not whether their life is worth 
living.50 
 
Keown illustrates his argument with the imaginary example of baby Bertha born with 
a terminal illness which will inevitably lead to death within a matter of hours: 
 
Her doctor informs her parents that, due to respiratory difficulties, she may 
stop breathing at any time and asks whether they would like attempts at 
artificial ventilation to be made should her breathing falter. Given that such 
efforts could not hope to reverse Bertha’s inevitable decline, and might impose 
significant burdens on her, they decide against ventilation as it would be 
disproportionate. In short, they decide to allow Bertha to die in peace. Yet 
their judgement in no way contravenes the principle of the sanctity of life; it 
is, indeed, an application of it.51 
 
Keown does not explain how, in deciding to allow Bertha to die in peace, the doctors 
nevertheless do not intend her to die in peace, and it may be that Keown’s choice of 
words here betrays an inadvertent acknowledgement of the difficulty he has in 
maintaining the position he is defending – there may be no escaping the fact that, 
ultimately, the doctors intend baby Bertha to die. I shall return to this issue later. First, 
it is necessary to see how this analysis applies to the situation of Anthony Bland, since 
the treatment he was receiving, owing to his state of complete and irreversible 
unconsciousness, could not possibly be considered to constitute a burden to him. 
 
                                                 
50 Ibid. at 486. 
51 (Italics added) ibid. at 487. 
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It is noteworthy that, in his article on Bland, Keown only gives a partial account of 
how his analysis of the intention/foresight distinction can apply to the case of 
Anthony Bland. He notes that the doctors could have withdrawn medical treatment 
from Anthony Bland on the grounds that the treatment was futile. This ground, as we 
have seen, is not sufficient of itself. It is also necessary that there be some purpose 
other than the death of Anthony Bland that is aimed at in withdrawing the treatment, 
such as relieving the patient from burdensome treatment. It is this purpose that would 
make the situation sufficiently analogous to the situation of palliative care so as to 
render the principle of double effect applicable to the situation of withdrawing or 
withholding treatment, and which renders it meaningful to say that death is only a 
side-effect of aiming to fulfil that purpose. It is perhaps not accidental that Keown 
only provides a partial answer to the question, since Anthony Bland, in a state of 
irreversible unconsciousness, could not meaningfully be said to suffer from any 
burdensome treatment at all. It may, perhaps, be because no such other purpose can be 
served here that the Lords felt no other analysis was available to them than that 
withdrawal of medical treatment would be intending to bring about Anthony Bland’s 
death.  
 
Could Keown insist, instead, that withdrawal of futile treatment is the purpose and so 
it is this only that is intended, not the patient’s death (which was merely foreseen as a 
certain outcome)? This would be like saying that, although I foresaw as certain that I 
would cause grievous bodily harm to my enemy if I shot him, I only intended to shoot 
him, not cause the grievous bodily harm. Further, it would commit Keown to the 
absurd tautology that the purpose of withdrawing the treatment is withdrawing the 
 25
treatment.52 There must be some purpose other than the side effect and other than the 
act itself which is capable of constituting the reason for the action in order for the 
distinction between intention and foresight to acquire a grip. For instance, 
withdrawing treatment because it is burdensome to the patient prima facie fulfils this 
requirement,53 as does providing chemotherapy to a cancer patient because it might 
make the cancer recede. 
 
Could Keown reply that avoidance of futililty provides the purpose of withdrawal? 
The treatment is withdrawn because it is futile, and death is merely a side-effect of 
that purpose. This response may seem prima facie plausible, but of itself, it is 
insufficiently analogous to the case of palliative care because no positive benefit can 
be said to be the purpose of the withdrawal – except perhaps the benefit of not being 
subjected to any further futile treatment. But it may be stretching language too far to 
say that it is of benefit to a permanently unconscious person not to subject him to 
further futile treatment. At best, it could only be said to be of benefit to others in that 
resources are not spent in the pursuit of futile treatment which could be spent on 
others where the treatment is not futile. But this, of course, is not an interpretation of 
‘avoidance of futility’ that is open since, at present, the law has preferred to decide the 
lawfulness of withdrawal independently of any considerations of a monetary kind.54 
 
                                                 
52 It is to avoid such tautologies that the law distinguishes between the act and its consequences – the 
question of intention is only applicable to the consequences of an act: Ryan v. R (1967) 121 C.L.R. 205 
per Barwick C.J. The question of whether an act is intended is not allowed by the law. Rather, the 
relevant question here is whether the act is voluntary. Here, since the act is withdrawal of futile 
treatment, the act of withdrawal cannot properly be said to be intentional or unintentional. It can only 
be said to be voluntary or involuntary. For this reason, Keown cannot say that the doctor only intends 
to withdraw the treatment, not to bring about the death of the patient. For his argument to work, then, 
he must locate a purpose other than the act of withdrawal itself, and other than the death of the patient, 
which can properly be described as intended.  
53 As we shall see below, however, there are reasons why this requirement is not, in fact, fulfilled. 
54 In Bland itself, for example, the decision was to be taken on the assumption that resources were 
infinite. 
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In spite of Keown’s failure to provide an analogous ground applicable to Bland, could 
one nevertheless be provided? Much emphasis was placed, in the case, on the fact that 
the continued treatment was invasive and subjected Anthony Bland to an intolerable 
indignity. It could therefore be argued that the purpose of withdrawing the treatment 
is to prevent Anthony Bland from undergoing further invasive treatment which is 
serving no positive medical purpose and to preserve his dignity.  
 
Would such a purpose render the situation in Bland sufficiently analogous to 
situations of palliative care as to allow the distinction between an intended and 
foreseen consequence (here, Anthony Bland’s death) to acquire a grip? 
 
There are three fundamental difficulties with any attempt to press such an analogy 
with palliative care. The first is that, if the independent purpose of withdrawal is taken 
to be to relieve the patient from his or her intolerable loss of dignity, then such relief 
can only come about as a result of the patient’s death. Consequently, unlike in 
palliative care, the purpose can only be achieved by means of the patient’s death. 
Further, in cases where the independent purpose of the withdrawal is to relieve the 
patient from burdensome treatment, it is impossible to describe a patient’s condition 
as having improved in any way by the withdrawal of the treatment. The second 
difficulty is that, if we were to grant Keown’s claim that his account provides the 
correct rationale of Bland and decisions post Bland, the law would be, as it currently 
stands, even more morally and intellectually misshapen than it is, according to 
Keown, at present. The third difficulty is that the distinction on which Keown relies 
between treating the patient’s condition, on the one hand, and treating the patient, on 
the other, cannot be sustained. We shall examine each of these difficulties in turn. We 
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shall then look at a fourth difficulty – the failure of Keown’s account to match the 
development of subsequent case law in the area. 
 
2.2.1 Relief from Intolerable Loss of Dignity and Improvement in Patient’s 
Condition 
 
We have seen that, in the case of a patient in a persistent vegetative state, it is not 
possible to describe the life-sustaining treatment as a burden to the patient. Suppose, 
then, that we take the independent purpose of the withdrawal to be relief from an 
intolerable loss of dignity. In this case, unlike in the case of palliative care, where 
relief from intolerable pain precedes death, the relief can only come from death itself, 
because the loss of dignity only ceases when the patient is, e.g., no longer turned in 
the bed, and no longer has their bladder emptied by catheter, etc. It is the patient’s 
death that brings relief from intolerable loss of dignity, in the case of withdrawal. 
Allowing the patient to die is considered to be preferable to maintaining him or her in 
their current state and continuing to administer all the treatment and associated duties 
that constitute an intolerable loss of dignity. 
 
What about cases where it might be argued that the purpose of withdrawal is to 
relieve the patient from burdensome treatment? There can be no doubt that, in 
palliative care, the patient’s condition can be improved by the administration of the 
dosage; if the treatment is successful, the patient’s condition can be improved because 
they will no longer be suffering from intolerable pain – and the freedom from 
intolerable pain is not brought about by the patient’s death, but by the pain relief 
supplied by the drugs. It is because relief from pain is clearly a benefit to the patient, 
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and is an improvement in their condition, that it is meaningful to say that the doctor in 
such a case intends to relieve the patient’s pain, not bring about the patient’s death, 
even when death is foreseen to be a consequence of the treatment. But, in the case of 
withdrawal, can it meaningfully be said that, when treatment is withdrawn, the 
patient’s condition is improved? It seems ludicrous to say so when it is known that the 
patient is going to starve and/or suffocate to death. To say that the benefit is to relieve 
the patient from burdensome treatment, when the alternative to that burdensome 
treatment is starvation and/or suffocation, seems to make a mockery of the concept of 
a ‘benefit’. To the ordinary reasonable person competent in using the term ‘benefit’, 
the benefit of withdrawal could only genuinely be said to arise when the patient is 
dead. But in that case, the death of the patient becomes the means by which the 
benefit is achieved – but death as the means by which a purpose is achieved is 
impermissible under the doctrine of double effect.55 
 
Withdrawal therefore seems to be insufficiently analogous to palliative care to allow 
the distinction between intention and foresight to acquire a genuine grip in such a 
case. This is no doubt why judges have been reluctant to apply this analysis to the 
case of withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment. 
 
                                                 
55 There is another reason why, in my judgement, withdrawal on the ground that the treatment is 
burdensome does not fall within the requirements of double-effect. In withdrawal, it can only be by 
refusing to give any further treatment that the relief can be brought, because it is that very life-
sustaining treatment that is causing the burden. The relief is therefore a direct consequence of allowing 
the patient to die. But in palliative care, pain relief does not come from the fact that the patient’s life is 
being abbreviated. In short, relief is not a direct consequence of abbreviating the patient’s life, but of  
the pain relieving properties in the drug. Correlatively, the pain does not come from the fact that the 
patient will live longer if the relief isn’t given, but rather the patient’s condition. This makes it 
meaningful to intend only to relieve pain, not kill the patient. But in cases where withdrawal is 
proposed, the burden comes directly from the treatment: because it is the very act of sustaining 
someone’s life that is causing the burden, removing that burden is necessarily choosing no longer to 
sustain that person’s life, and choosing no longer to sustain that person’s life is therefore intending that 
they be allowed to die. It follows that it is not meaningful only to remove the burden, without also 
intending the patient to die. 
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2.2.2 If Keown’s Account were Right, would the Law be any less Morally and 
Intellectually Misshapen? 
 
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the distinction did validly apply to 
withdrawal from Anthony Bland. Arguably, we would have a situation in which the 
intellectual and moral shape of our law would be even more distorted than it is, 
according to Keown and Finnis, at present. For there are many other situations of 
medical practice where the distinction cannot be said to apply and where intention 
must clearly be present, but which are not taken to be intentional killings (i.e., where, 
notwithstanding the presence of intention, absence of causation immunises a doctor 
against criminal liability). This is so, for instance, in the case of competent refusals of 
medical treatment, where a competent patient refuses medical treatment even where 
they know that, in doing so, they will die.  
 
Take, for instance, the circumstance of Re B (adult: refusal of medical treatment).56 
Here, B wanted a declaration that it would be lawful to have treatment withdrawn, not 
because the treatment was burdensome, but because her life had become intolerable to 
her. She gave evidence in that case, for instance, of not being able gain ‘significant 
enough recovery to have a better quality of life’.57 There was no question, in that case, 
of the treatment having become burdensome to her. Indeed, Mrs B recognised that a 
certain degree of rehabilitation was possible for her.58 Such rehabilitation, however, 
did not represent to her the possibility of a sufficient quality of life to make her 
reconsider her decision. In declaring it lawful for doctors to withdraw treatment from 
her, the English Court of Appeal made no effort whatsoever to rely on the distinction 
                                                 
56 [2002] 2 All E.R. 449.  
57 [2002] 2 All E.R. 449 at 461. 
58 [2002] 2 All E.R. 449 at 461. 
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between intended and foreseen consequences in order to hold that Mrs B merely 
foresaw her own death, nor on the distinction between burdensome but futile 
treatment, versus a burdensome quality of life. If, therefore, the doctors were not to be 
considered to be assisting suicide and thereby intentionally contributing to her death, 
and if, likewise, Mrs B herself was not to be considered to be committing suicide, 
some ground other than intention had to be relied on in order to exculpate the doctors 
in that case from criminal liability – e.g., causation. It would be very odd indeed if 
that alternative ground were to apply exclusively to cases of competent refusal and 
were not also to extend to cases of withholding and withdrawing treatment. In order 
for Keown’s arguments to be successful, he must find a way of dealing with such a 
case,59 otherwise he would be committed to the belief that doctors in such a case are 
unlawfully assisting suicide.  
 
It is worth belabouring this point in order to tease out the consequences of it for 
Keown’s analysis. If Keown’s alternative rationale for the law in Bland is going to 
represent, as he claims, a more coherent, better shaped body of law, he would have to 
argue that the case of competent refusal, too, ought only to be permitted if the patient 
does not intend their own death, but merely foresees it.60 If it were otherwise, a doctor 
would be assisting suicide (this is so because Keown rejects the relevance of the 
act/omission distinction altogether for all end of life issues). If competent refusal of 
treatment were only permitted if the death of the patient were merely foreseen, and 
                                                 
59 It is, perhaps, unsurprising that Keown argues that the distinction between intention and foresight 
applies also to cases of refusal of medical treatment. When someone refuses medical treatment, they do 
not necessarily intend to die, according to Keown. On the contrary, they merely foresee their own 
death. See J. Keown Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy (Cambridge 2002) at 66-8. The 
implausibility of this account of lawful refusal is exposed by Re B itself: having known, from the 
evidence, that Mrs B’s life had become intolerable to her, Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss should, on 
Keown’s account of the law, have ruled the refusal of the treatment unlawful because she clearly 
wanted to end her life on account of its quality not on account of the burdensomeness, or futility, of the 
treatment. 
60 See the previous note. 
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not intended, by the patient, then investigation of the reasons for the patient’s refusal 
would be necessary. But the law as it stands states that the patient’s right of veto is 
absolute. As Lord Donaldson puts it in Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment):61 
 
The right of choice is not limited to decisions which others might regard as 
sensible. It exists notwithstanding that the reasons for making the choice are 
rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent. 
 
Because the right to veto is absolute, investigation of the reasons for refusing 
treatment is unnecessary. Yet it would follow from Keown’s account that the 
principle, in the context of competent refusal of life-sustaining treatment, that the 
performance of a medical operation on a person without their consent is unlawful 
would have to be qualified: the doctor would have to ensure that the patient was not 
intending their own death (basing their decision, for example, on considerations of the 
quality of their life), but merely foreseeing it as a consequence of no longer wanting to 
be subjected to further treatment. This is not, however, the law. On the contrary, 
reference to whether or not the patient is merely foreseeing their death, as opposed to 
intending it, is not a precondition for whether the withholding/withdrawal is lawful. 
This, in my judgement, represents a formidable obstacle to the kind of account 
proposed by Keown. He cannot defend his account by claiming that judges have 
merely misexplained the lawfulness of competent refusal, and that, in reality, the 
distinction between intention and foresight is the better rationale. For the law itself 
would have to change – doctors would have to be allowed to perform a medical 
                                                 
61 [1993] Fam. 95 at 113. 
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operation on a person without their consent if they discovered that such a patient 
intended their own death.62  
 
2.2.3 Problems with Keown’s Reliance on the Distinction between Treating the 
Patient and Treating the Patient’s Condition 
 
A further conceptual difficulty with the legal account proposed by Keown concerns 
his analysis of the concept of medical futility, which forms the fourth premise of his 
argument as outlined above. Keown insists that medical futility refers merely to the 
futility of treating the patient’s condition and is not a judgement concerning the 
patient’s quality of life. Whether the patient will live or die is an immaterial 
consideration in the judgement of whether treatment is futile. We have already seen 
above that this account does not apply to the cases of competent refusals of treatment. 
But although, in the case of withdrawal from an incompetent patient, this argument 
works up to a point, it is difficult to see how it can be kept separate from the question 
of whether the patient should be allowed to die by withdrawing treatment, and the 
latter question can only be answered by reference to considerations of the quality, not 
of the patient’s condition (we already know that treatment of the condition is futile) 
but of the patient’s life. When the patient is not actually dying of his or her condition 
(as in the Tony Bland case), the question is surely inescapably the question of whether 
continuing to treat the person is worthwhile, and not simply whether continuing to 
treat the condition is worthwhile. In other words, a relevant consideration in whether 
the treatment should be continued is whether such treatment would allow the patient 
                                                 
62 The intractable practical difficulties such a law would involve – how, in each case, we really tell 
whether the patient intends or merely foresees their own death (and the associated difficulties of 
policing the law this would involve), the amount of hard or borderline cases that would be thrown up, 
etc., are further evidence for concluding that, as a matter of law, the distinction between intention and 
foresight cannot be applied in these cases. 
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to continue living. Consider, for instance, the case of those who require kidney 
dialysis machines to continue living. Assume, for the sake of argument, that a kidney 
transplant is unavailable to them during their lifetime, and no cure will be discovered 
to improve their condition. In such a case, medical treatment as Keown understands it 
is certainly futile – nothing further can be done for them to improve their condition. 
But we would surely baulk at the suggestion that it should be withdrawn.63 The reason 
is that people who require those machines are nevertheless capable of leading a life. It 
follows that quality of life considerations necessarily and inescapably enter into the 
judgement of whether to continue or withdraw treatment, and therefore of whether the 
treatment really is futile. The only way Keown can escape this conclusion is by 
conceding that a competent person can make quality of life judgements in their own 
case, but a surrogate or the court cannot make a quality of life judgement in the case 
of incompetent patients. But this route is closed off to Keown because such a 
concession would commit him to another one he could not countenance, viz., that a 
competent person, in making that judgement, would be committing suicide. He would 
be committed to this conclusion because, as we saw above, he rejects the distinction 
between acts and omissions and therefore rejects the view that death is caused 
exclusively by the underlying illness in such cases. 
 
2.2.4 Further Difficulties with Keown’s Suggested Rationale – Departure from 
Current Case Law 
 
                                                 
63 Keown would no doubt respond that this case is catered for by the fact that the patient would be 
mentally competent and, if they did not want the treatment to be withdrawn, there would be no question 
of withdrawing the treatment. But such a reply begs the question: the condition here (ex hypothesi) is 
untreatable, so what makes it wrong to withdraw it is the fact that the patient nevertheless considers 
themselves capable of living a meaningful life and indicates their desire to carry on living. 
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In addition to these conceptual difficulties, it is noteworthy that subsequent case law 
has not agreed with the analysis offered by Keown nor the guidelines of the BMA.64 
In 2001 the Family Division of the English High Court was free to reconsider the 
analysis of the lawfulness of withholding and withdrawing treatment following the 
implementation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms into English domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998 
(UK). In NHS Turst A v. M; NHS Trust B v. H,65 the task of reconsidering the law in 
the light of this Act was duly undertaken. Article 2(1) of the Convention, entitled 
‘Right to Life’ provides: 
 
Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of 
his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following 
his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 
 
Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss had to consider the question of whether a proposal to 
withdraw treatment from a patient in a permanent vegetative state would violate this 
provision. In considering this question, Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss felt it necessary 
to answer the following questions which directly bear on our analysis: 
 
(a) Is the intention of the withdrawal of treatment to bring about the patient’s 
death or shorten his or her life? 
                                                 
64 Recall the BMA guidelines on withholding and withdrawing treatment, which state, in accordance 
with the analysis offered by Keown, that a doctor can withhold or withdraw treatment where death is 
foreseen but not where it is intended. BMA, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-prolonging Medical 
Treatment. Guidance for Decision-Making (BMJ Books 1999) at 50. 
65 [2001] Fam.  348.  
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(b) Does an omission to provide life-sustaining treatment constitute an 
intentional deprivation?66 
 
In answer to the first question, Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss held that the analysis in 
Bland was right and that the intention of the withdrawal was to bring about the 
patient’s death or shorten his or her life: 
 
Although…I am no longer bound by the decision in Bland’s case, the speeches 
of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, where he said…[that] ‘the whole purpose of 
stopping artificial feeding is to bring about the death of Anthony bland’ and of 
Lord Lowry… are most persuasive.67 
 
In answer to the second question, she again relied on the act/omission distinction 
relied on in Bland to hold that there would be no intentional deprivation of life: 
 
Although the intention in withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration in PVS 
cases is to hasten death, in my judgment the phrase ‘deprivation of life’ [in the 
Convention] must import a deliberate act, as opposed to an omission…which 
results in death. A responsible decision by a medical team not to provide 
treatment at the initial stage could not amount to intentional deprivation of life 
by the state. Such a decision based on clinical judgement is an omission to 
act.68 
 
                                                 
66 [2001] Fam.  348 at 356. 
67 [2001] Fam.348 at 356. 
68 [2001] Fam.348 at 358.  
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It is therefore the case that, in spite of the academic criticism of Bland and the 
reference to that criticism in the case law, as well as the position taken by the BMA, 
the law remains the same as it was in Bland: in withholding and withdrawing 
treatment, a doctor intends to bring about or to hasten the death of the patient (rather 
than merely foreseeing it), and criminal responsibility is ultimately not imposed 
because withholding and withdrawing treatment is to be regarded as an omission, not 
an act, and there is no duty in such cases to carry on providing treatment that has 
become futile. I therefore must now address the question of whether this approach can 
indeed withstand the criticism that has been mounted against it and whether the 
anxieties expressed by Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Mustill are unfounded. 
 
In the following section I consider an alternative approach to making sense of the 
decision in Bland and the lawfulness of withholding and withdrawing medical 
treatment. In particular, we will see that the anxieties expressed by Lord Browne-
Wilkinson and Lord Mustill concerning the implications of their decision for the 
moral relevance of the distinction between withdrawal and euthanasia are, in fact, 
unjustified.  
 
III. THE DIFFERING ETHICAL STATUSES OF WITHDRAWING 
TREATMENT AND EUTHANASIA 
 
What then is the alternative? Are we committed to agreeing with the account given by 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Mustill of the implications of the Bland decision 
that the law is intellectually and morally misshapen? Are we forced to accede to the 
view, suggested in that case, that the principle of the sanctity of life has suffered a 
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significant set-back? Is it genuinely the case that there is no relevant moral distinction 
between lawful withholding and withdrawal of treatment, on the one hand, and 
euthanasia on the other – the view expressed in Bland? 
 
Their Lordships in Bland focussed exclusively on the act/omission distinction. 
Anthony Bland’s death was not going to result in criminal responsibility because 
withdrawal of medical treatment is an omission, not an act. Although one can be 
criminally responsible for one’s intentional omissions, doctors would only be 
criminally responsible in this case if there were a duty to continue providing treatment 
to Anthony Bland. Since the treatment was unanimously considered, by those 
concerned in the medical profession, to be futile, the court, following Bolam,69 ruled 
that withdrawal would be lawful.  
 
Naturally, some members of the court were aware, as we have seen, that the decision 
might appear hypocritical. It is worth recalling the words of Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
at this point: 
 
How can it be lawful to allow a patient to die slowly, though painlessly, over a 
period of weeks from lack of food, but unlawful to produce his immediate 
death by a lethal injection, thereby saving his family from yet another ordeal 
to add to the tragedy that has already struck them? I find it difficult to find a 
moral answer to that question. But it is undoubtedly the law and nothing I 
                                                 
69 Bolam v. Friern Barnet Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582 
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have said casts doubt on the proposition that the doing of a positive act with 
the intention of ending life is and remains murder.70  
 
While the act/omission distinction is central to the ratio of the case, the analysis of the 
distinction offered by their Lordships failed to take into account the wider context in 
which the distinction was put into operation, and it is therefore unsurprising that they 
were left with acute feelings of unease in their exposition of the law. For instance, 
without exception, all cases of lawful withdrawal concern the question of whether a 
patient’s life should continue to be prolonged. The fact that the issue in these cases is 
always whether to discontinue treatment which is artificially prolonging the life of the 
patient has received insufficient attention, yet it is the key to what I would describe as 
the abyssal difference between lawful withholding or withdrawal of treatment and 
euthanasia. What is proposed in euthanasia is that we wrest control from nature our 
ultimate fate: we decide when and how we should die, and we ensure thereby that we 
have the last word. In lawful withdrawal, by contrast, the very opposite is the case: we 
interfere with nature, not in killing the patient, but in keeping the patient alive, and the 
question of whether or not we should withdraw treatment is at bottom the question of 
whether we should restore to nature her dominion, allowing nature finally to take its 
course, with the patient dying a natural death. In short, the moral relevance of the 
distinction can therefore be put in this way: euthanasia interferes with nature’s 
dominion, whereas withdrawal of treatment restores to nature her dominion after we 
had taken it away when artificially prolonging the patient’s life. 
 
                                                 
70 [1993] A.C. 789 at 885.  
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This difference explains, I think, why, in the case of withdrawal, the principle of the 
inviolability of life remains undisturbed. In withdrawal, we are not taking control of 
death in the way we do in the practice of euthanasia, because the issue in withdrawal 
is when we should stop artificially prolonging life and allow nature to take its course 
– to stop deferring what, at some point, is inevitable. In euthanasia, by contrast, we 
anticipate nature and override it by bringing about the patient’s death before its time. 
For someone who is inclined to see life as a gift,71 or as something worthy of genuine 
respect and protection, the idea that we could have the final say concerning when 
death should occur can seem wrong. This is a meaningful and coherent moral 
position. Because of this difference between withdrawal and euthanasia, people can 
and do rationally disagree on which course of action should be allowed to be legally 
available. 
 
Once the context of the dilemma is brought into full focus, it is easier to see how the 
act and omission distinction can be given a genuine application in the case of lawful 
withdrawal. With euthanasia, one simply cannot say that the patient nevertheless dies 
from the underlying condition. Euthanasia becomes an overriding cause to the point, 
ultimately, of constituting a novus actus interveniens. In the case of withholding or 
withdrawing treatment from incompetent patients, by contrast, human intervention 
into the natural sequence of events has already occurred at the stage of administering 
                                                 
71 Philosophers such as Singer have considered that this notion of life as a gift is a religious notion that, 
in a secular era, is increasingly losing its relevance. This explanation assumes that religion is the origin 
of the idea of life as a gift. But couldn’t the opposite be the case? Could it not be our sense of life as a 
gift that is the impulse for religion? The suggestion is at least plausible, and merits serious 
consideration – it would explain, for instance, why so many people who claim to live by a secular ethic 
nevertheless endorse the principle of the sanctity of life. 
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the life-prolonging treatment, and the question of withdrawal, in particular, is whether 
to allow the underlying condition (cause) of death to take effect.72 
 
At this point, the only remaining question is that of whether the doctor has a duty to 
continue treating a patient such that their omission could be considered to be an 
overriding novus actus interveniens in the event of the patient’s death. Here, in the 
case of incompetent patients, questions of the futility of the treatment do become 
relevant. It cannot simply be assumed that the duty exists and it is for this reason that 
Thomas J is right to say in Auckland Area Health Board v. A-G73 that the question of 
causation, in the context of omissions and therefore of whether or not a duty of care is 
owed to the person concerned, is really a question of whether moral and legal 
culpability should or should not be attributed to the doctor if treatment is withdrawn.74 
 
If this analysis is correct, it would follow that, if there was any mistake in the 
judgement of Bland, it was in their Lordships’ conclusion that their decision on the 
lawfulness of withdrawal had implications for the principle of the sanctity of life. If 
that principle is understood in terms of not intentionally taking ultimate control of life 
and death, then, on that understanding, allowing someone to die of natural causes is 
not a violation of that principle. It also follows that the assessments of Lord Browne- 
Wilkinson and Lord Mustill concerning the non-relevance of the act/omission 
                                                 
72 In the case of competent patients, such as Mrs B in Re B, the patient’s right to refuse means that they 
allow themselves to die by their underlying illness or condition. The law imposes no duty on them, and 
no duty on their doctors, to sustain their life. When, by contrast, they wish to carry on living, a doctor 
has a duty to continue administering the treatment. If the doctor discontinues the treatment, then s/he is 
criminally responsible for the patients death, not because s/he has factually caused it, but because s/he 
has allowed the patient to die of their underlying condition when s/he could have intervened to prevent 
that death, and had a duty to do so (because the patient wanted to continue living). As pointed out by 
Thomas J. in Auckland Area Health Board v. A-G [1993] 1 N.Z.R. 235, the question of causation in 
these contexts is therefore, at bottom, the question of whether moral and/or legal responsibility is to be 
attributed to a doctor. 
73 [1993] 1 N.Z.R. 235. 
74 Ibid. at 249. 
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distinction were mistaken. The distinction between an act and omission in this context 
– the distinction between withdrawal and euthanasia – is a robust moral distinction 
and is not, contrary to the positions of Lords Browne-Wilkinson, Mustill and Goff, 




The reason for the lawfulness of the withholding and withdrawing of treatment resides 
exclusively with issues of causation and not, as Keown and Finnis have thought, in 
issues of intention. For the reasons we have seen, it is not possible to apply the 
principle of double effect to the cases of withholding/withdrawal and lawful refusal of 
treatment. The distinction between merely foreseeing a person’s death and intending it 
is not possible to draw in those cases, unlike in the case of palliative care. To that 
extent, contrary to the views of Keown and Finnis, their Lordships in Bland were right 
to insist that the intention to bring about Anthony’s death was present. Nevertheless, 
‘bringing about Anthony’s death’ can mean one of two things. It might mean actively 
killing him, as would be the case if a lethal injection were administered to the patient. 
In such a case, the control of the patient’s life and death is completely wrested from 
nature and put entirely into our hands. Or it might mean allowing nature to take its 
course, that is, allowing the patient to die from the condition that has afflicted them. 
In such a case, the artificial intervention into the natural course of things is reversed, 
and nature’s dominion is restored. Clearly, these two courses of action have 
significant moral relevance, and opinions can reasonably diverge on whether both 
courses of action should become legally available options. To that extent, they 
represent considerably different moral options, and Lord Mustill was wrong to think 
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‘that the ethical status of the two courses of action is for all relevant purposes 
indistinguishable’.75 
                                                 
75 Airedale National Health Service Trust v. Bland [1993] A.C. 789.  
